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REMITTITUR IN ENVIRONMENTAL CASES: 
DEVELOPING A STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR 
FEDERAL COURTS 
Diana Garcia* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Remittitur l is a procedural device used by the courts to reduce 
excessive jury verdicts. 2 When a trial court finds a jury's verdict 
excessive, it may offer the plaintiff the option of accepting a specified 
reduction in the damages as an alternative to a new trial. 3 Remittitur 
is also a procedure available at the appellate level primarily to cor-
rect an excessive award resulting from reversible error committed 
at the trial level. 4 
Since its genesis in an 1822 opinion by Justice Story,5 remittitur 
has become a widely accepted method of curing extraordinarily large 
damage awards. 6 Remittitur is widely favored by judges because it 
is an expedient measure that saves the courts the time and expense 
* Citations Editor, 1988-89, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1 Remittitur has been defined as: "The procedural process by which a verdict of the jury is 
diminished by subtraction." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1164 (5th ed. 1979). 
The Latin equivalent "remittit damna" technically means "[a]n entry on the record, by 
which the plaintiff declares that he remits a part of the damages which have been awarded 
him." Id. 
2 See Spence v. Board of Educ. of Christina School Dist., 806 F.2d 1198, 1201 (3d Cir. 1986) 
("The rationalization for, and use of, the remittitur is well established as a device employed 
when the trial judge finds that a decision of a jury is clearly unsupported and/or excessive."); 
J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 12.4, at 556-57 (1985) [here-
inafter CIVIL PROCEDURE]; 6A J. MOORE, J. LUCAS & G. GROTHEER, MOORE'S FEDERAL 
PRACTICE ~ 59.08[7], at 59-187 (2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE]; Note, 
Remittitur Practice in the Federal Courts, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 299 (1976) [hereinafter Re-
mittitur Practice]. 
;3 Remittitur Practice, supra note 2, at 299. 
4 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 2, 11 59.08[7], at 59-188-189. 
5 Blunt v. Little, 3 F. Cas. 760, 761 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 1,578). 
6 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 2, 11 59.08[7], at 59-189. 
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of a new trial. 7 In light of the recent efforts toward tort reform and 
the concern for the ramifications of large jury verdicts, there is a 
judicial trend toward tighter control of jury awards. 8 Given its effi-
cacy and favorable acceptance by the courts, remittitur has received 
a considerable amount of renewed attention. 9 The ABA Action Com-
mission on the Tort Liability System has suggested an increased use 
of remittitur to control large jury verdicts, as an alternative to 
statutory ceilings on certain types of damages, such as those for pain 
and suffering. 10 
While the Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of re-
mittitur,l1 some courts and commentators still question whether re-
mittitur's constitutional basis is solid. 12 Most courts follow the Su-
preme Court's rulings that remittitur is reconcilable with the seventh 
amendment. 13 
Although remittitur is well-accepted and widely used, federal 
courts do not apply uniform standards when making decisions in-
volving remittitur. 14 As a result, no consistent standard exists in the 
7 E.g., Hendrix v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 776 F.2d 1492, 1507 (1lth Cir. 1985) (quoting 
6A J. MOORE, J. LUCAS & G. GROTHEER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ~ 59.08[7], at 59-189 
(2d ed. 1985)); United States v. 47.14 Acres of Land, More or Less, 674 F.2d 722, 728 (8th 
Cir. 1982). 
K See Gumbs v. Pueblo Int'l, Inc., 823 F.2d 768 (3d Cir. 1987). In Gumbs, the jury awarded 
the plaintiff $900,000 for injuries she sustained when she slipped and fell in one of the 
defendant's supermarkets. [d. at 769. In ordering a remittitur of $660,882.25, id. at 775, or, 
in the alternative, a new trial on the issue of damages, the court noted the "increasing 
willingness of the appellate courts to review damages awards." [d. at 773. The court concluded 
that this recent trend "is a response to the increasingly outrageous amounts demanded by 
plaintiffs and awarded by juries." [d.; Williams v. Martin Marietta Alumin.a, Inc., 817 F.2d 
1030, 1041 (3d Cir. 1987) (there is "an increasing appellate trend to review the merits of a 
damage award, even though the scope of our review is limited"). 
9 See supra notes 2, 7 and 8; REPORT OF THE ABA ACTION COMMISSION TO IMPROVE THE 
TORT LIABILITY SYSTEM (February 1987) [hereinafter TORT SYSTEM REPORT]. 
10 TORT SYSTEM REPORT, supra note 9, at 13. 
I! Northern Pac. R.R. v. Herbert, 116 U.S. 642, 644 (1886); Arkansas Valley Land and 
Cattle Co. v. Herbert, 130 U.S. 69, 74 (1889); Hansen v. Boyd, 161 U.S. 397, 412 (1896); 
Woodworth v. Chesbrough, 244 U.S. 79 (1917); Dimick v. Scheidt, 293 U.S. 474, 486-87 (1935). 
12 See Bonura v. Sea Land Service, Inc., 512 F.2d 671, 673 (5th Cir. 1975) (per curiam) 
(Goldberg, J., dissenting) ("The doctrine of remittitur rests on a constitutional base of clay."); 
Firestone v. Crown Center Redevelopment Corporation, 693 S.W.2d 99, 110 (Mo. 1985) (en 
bane) (remittitur involves "an assumption of a power to weigh the evidence, a function reserved 
to the trier(s) of fact"); Remittitur Practice, supra note 2, at 301 n.21. 
13 Sam's Style Shop v. Cosmos Broadcasting Corp., 694 F.2d 998, 1005 (5th Cir. 1982); 
Doralee Estates v. Cities Service Oil Co., 569 F.2d 716, 722 (2d Cir. 1977); Campus Sweater 
& Sportswear Co. v. M.B. Kahn Constr. Co., 515 F. Supp. 64, 103 (D. S.C. 1979), afl'd mem., 
644 F.2d 877 (4th Cir. 1981). 
14 See CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 2, § 12.4, at 557-58; Note, Remittitur of Punitive 
Damages in Exchange for Product Recall: O'Gilvie v. International Playtex, 34 U. !CAN. L. 
REV. 823, 828 (1986) [hereinafter Remittitur of Punitive Damages]. 
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federal courts to determine whether a jury verdict is excessive,15 or 
to determine the appropriate amount of remittitur once the verdict 
is found to be excessive. 16 Courts often decide to remit a portion of 
the damages without articulating a clear basis for the reduction. 17 
Given that remittitur is a highly discretionary procedure that 
involves second-guessing a jury's determination, it requires a more 
clearly defined standard that will allow courts to consider important 
policy issues involved in environmental litigation. Recently, remit-
titur has played a significant role in cases involving large punitive 
damage awards. 18 Cases involving environmental issues are likely 
candidates for large jury awards. 19 Punitive damage awards in civil 
suits against toxic polluters are an important means of policing ac-
tivity injurious to the environment. 2o Thus, there are several factors 
that courts should consider before determining that a remittitur is 
the appropriate action. 21 
This Comment begins with a discussion of remittitur's genesis and 
its early reception in the United States Supreme Court. This section 
of the Comment also discusses the constitutional arguments for and 
against remittitur. The latter portion of this section examines the 
1" See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
16 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 2, ~ 59.08[7], at 59-193, 195. 
17 See Bonura v. Sea Land Service, Inc., 512 F.2d 671, 673 (5th Cir. 1975) (per curiam) 
(Goldberg, J., dissenting). 
l' Rawson v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 615 F. Supp. 1546, 1549 (D. Colo. 1985) (court 
considered remittitur, but upheld the jury award of $10,000,000 in exemplary damages for 
unlawful termination). See also O'Gilvie v. International Playtex, Inc., 821 F.2d 1438 (lOth 
Cir. 1987); Ealy v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., No. 83-3504, slip op. at 14-15 (D.D.C. Oct. 1, 
1987) (court remitted the entire $75,000,000 punitive damage award in a product liability case 
involving the anti-nausea drug, benedictin). 
In O'Gilvie, the jury awarded the plaintiff $10,000,000 in punitive damages in addition to 
$1,525,000 in compensatory damages. 821 F.2d at 1440. Upon agreement by the defendant to 
discontinue the sale of the product along with other ameliorative actions, the district court 
reduced the punitive damages to $1,350,000. Id. at 1440-41. Finding that the district court 
lacked authority for remitting the award on this basis, the Tenth Circuit reversed the lower 
court's order and remanded the case to the lower court in order to reinstate the jury's verdict 
as to punitive damages. Id. at 1450. 
I" Sterling v. Velsicol Chemical Corp., 647 F. Supp. 303 (W.D. Tenn. 1986). In Sterling, 
hazardous chemical waste from the defendant's chemical waste burial site escaped and con-
taminated the water in wells within a three mile radius of the site. Id. at 306. In addition to 
an award of $5,273,492.50 for compensatory damages, the court also awarded punitive damages 
amounting to $7,500,000. Id. at 307. See also Cathey v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 776 F.2d 
1565, 1567-68 (6th Cir. 1985) (asbestos-related case where the jury awarded the plaintiff 
$800,000 in compensatory damages and $1,500,000 in punitive damages). 
20 For a discussion of the function of punitive damages in environmental litigation as a 
policing mechanism see inji'a notes 179-93 and accompanying text. 
21 For a discussion of these factors see infra notes 205-25 and accompanying text. 
122 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 16:119 
modern use of remittitur and the increased attention that it has 
received. 
The second section of this Comment examines the procedural steps 
of remittitur both at the trial and appellate levels. Included in this 
discussion are the guidelines currently used by federal courts in 
making decisions on allegedly excessive verdicts. 
Finally, the last section of this Comment discusses the importance 
of punitive damages in environmental cases. Despite their impor-
tance, exemplary awards in environmental cases are threatened by 
the recent trend toward the judicial control of jury verdicts. In order 
to protect these awards from the threat of judicial intervention, 
certain procedural safeguards should be taken. This Comment ulti-
mately suggests that federal courts should take special policy con-
siderations into account in determining whether remittitur is appro-
priate in environmental cases. 
II. REMITTITUR PRACTICE 
A. Remittitur's Genesis 
Remittitur's genesis was in an 1822 opinion by Judge, later Justice, 
Story. The jury in Blunt v. Little22 awarded the plaintiff $2,000 in 
an action for malicious prosecution. 23 Claiming that the verdict was 
excessive, the defendant moved for a new trial. 24 Judge Story agreed 
with the defendant, but he did not order a new trial outright. 25 
Without citing any precedent,26 Justice Story offered the plaintiff 
the alternative of remittitur, stating: 
I have the greatest hesitation in interfering with the verdict, 
and in so doing, I believe that I go to the very limits of the law. 
After full reflection, I am of [the] opinion, that it is reasonable, 
that the cause should be submitted to another jury, unless the 
plaintiff is willing to remit $500 of his damages. If he does, the 
court ought not to interfere further. 27 
The plaintiff accepted the remittitur of $500, and the court overruled 
the motion for a new trial. 28 
223 F. Cas. 760 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 1,578). 
23Id. at 760. 
24Id. The defendant had stated various grounds for a new trial, but on appeal only two 
grounds remained. One of the grounds was that the award was excessive. Id. at 76l. 
25 See id. at 761-62. 
26 See id. at 762. 
27Id. 
'" Id. 
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After Blunt v. Little, state courts also used remittitur.29 Remit-
titur first came before the United States Supreme Court in Northern 
Pacific Railroad v. Herbert. 3D In Herbert, the Court relied on these 
previous state decisions to uphold the remittitur procedure. 31 The 
Court addressed the validity of remittitur briefly by stating that it 
was within the discretion of the trial court. 32 The Court further 
stated that because the remittitur only involved the reduction to 
that portion of the damages awarded improperly by the jury, the 
corrected verdict should be allowed to stand. 33 
Since the approval of remittitur by the Supreme Court in Herbert, 
remittitur has enjoyed widespread use34 as an alternative to a new 
trial,35 and as a remedy for awards resulting from reversible error. 36 
Recently, remittitur has also been considered as an alternative to 
statutory ceilings on non-economic damages. 37 Despite the wide-
spread use of remittitur, its constitutional validity is still questioned 
by courts and commentators. 
B. Constitutionality of Remittitur 
Because remittitur involves the review of a jury's verdict, it raises 
a question of constitutionality under the seventh amendment. 38 In 
29 See, e.g., Doyle v. Dixon, 97 Mass. 208 (1867) (breach of contract action where the jury 
awarded the plaintiff $800 and the trial judge's offer to the plaintiff to remit $400 in lieu of a 
new trial was upheld); Hayden v. Florence Sewing Machine Co., 54 N.Y. 221 (1873) (wrongful 
eviction case where jury awarded the plaintiff $8,695 for damage to his business and the 
General Term offered a remittitur of $4,050 as an alternative to reversal). 
30 116 U.S. 642 (1886). Herbert was a personal injury action by a brakeman against the 
railroad. I d. at 643. Faulty brakes caused the collision of two cars that resulted in serious 
injury to the plaintiff's leg, which had to be amputated. Id. 
31 See id. at 646. 
32 Id. at 646-47. 
33Id. 
34 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, ~ 59.08[7], at 59-189; Note, O'Gilvie v. International Play-
tex, Inc.: An Improper Remittitur of a Punitive Damage Award, 81 NW. U.L. REV. 288 
(1987) [hereinafter Improper Remittitur]. See also infra notes 35-37 and accompanying text. 
35 See, e.g., Fenner v. Dependable Trucking Co., 716 F.2d 598, 603 (9th Cir. 1983) ("When 
a court ... determines that the damages award is excessive, it has two alternatives. It may 
grant [the] defendant's motion for a new trial or deny the motion conditional upon the 
prevailing party accepting a remittitur.") (footnote omitted). 
36 See, e.g., Hendrix v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 776 F.2d 1492, 1507 (11th Cir. 1985) 
(appellate court ordered a remittitur of the amount of the award that included future medical 
expenses where it was reversible error to instruct the jury to include those damages without 
sufficient evidence); Joiner Systems, Inc. v. AVM Corp., 517 F.2d 45,49 (3d Cir. 1975) (in a 
breach of contract action, appellate court ordered a remittitur or, in the alternative, a new 
trial, where the trial judge erroneously instructed the jury to decide pre-repudiation damages 
when they were not an issue presented at trial). 
:17 TORT SYSTEM REPORT, supra note 9, at 13. 
3" The seventh amendment provides in pertinent part that "no fact tried by a jury, shall be 
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applying remittitur, the judge is arguably infringing upon the jury's 
role to weigh the evidence and to assess the damages according to 
what the community conscience dictates. 39 The argument follows that 
plaintiffs are consequently denied their constitutional right to have 
their case decided by an impartial group representing the collective 
conscience of the community. 40 
Despite this constitutional argument against remittitur, the Su-
preme Court continues to reaffirm its use. 41 For example, in Arkan-
sas Valley Land and Cattle Co. v. Mann,42 the Court confirmed the 
validity of remittitur, stating that: 
The practice which this court approved in Northern Pacific Rail-
road v. Herbert is sustained by sound reason, and does not, in 
any just sense, impair the constitutional right of trial by jury. It 
cannot be disputed that the court is within the limits of its 
authority when it sets aside the verdict of the jury and grants a 
new trial where the damages are palpably or outrageously ex-
cessive. 43 
The Supreme Court last addressed the constitutionality of remit-
titur in Dimick v. Scheidt. 44 Although the case involved the review 
of additur,45 a procedure in which a judge increases an inadequate 
jury award, the Court also addressed its countermeasure, remitti-
tur.46 The Court found additur unconstitutional, but upheld the prac-
tice of remittitur. 47 By the time the Dimick Court made this decision, 
remittitur was so established that the Court considered it too late 
to disturb the doctrine. 48 Reasoning that remittitur has the "effect 
of merely lopping off" the unlawful excess of a jury-determined 
verdict,49 the Court concluded that it was a constitutional procedure, 
otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the 
common law." U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
39 See CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 2, § 12.4, at 557. 
40 See MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, ~ 59.08[7], at 59-189 & n.8. 
41 Northern Pac. R.R. v. Herbert, 116 U.S. 642, 644 (1886); Hansen v. Boyd, 161 U.S. 397, 
412 (1896); Woodworth v. Chesbrough, 244 U.S. 79 (1917); Dimick v. Scheidt, 293 U.S. 474, 
486-87 (1935). 
42 130 U.S. 69 (1889). 
43 [d. at 74 (citations omitted). 
44293 U.S. 474 (1935). 
45 Additur is "[t]he power of [a] trial court to assess damages or increase [the] amount of 
an inadequate award made by jury verdict." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 36 (5th ed. 1979). 
46 Dimick, 293 U.S. at 484-87. 
47 [d. at 486-87. Although additur is unconstitutional, a court may order a new trial when 
it finds the jury's award inadequate. MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 2, ~ 59.08[7], 
at 59-187. 
48 293 U.S. at 484-85. 
49 [d. at 486. 
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whereas additur was a "bald addition" determined solely by the 
judge and not the jury. 50 In upholding remittitur, the reasoning of 
the Court seemed to be based more upon the reluctance to overturn 
a well-established practice rather than a thorough constitutional 
analysis. 51 
Recently, the Supreme Court ratified the use of remittitur in 
Donovan v. Penn Shipping. 52 Without discussing the constitution-
ality of remittitur, the Court in a per curiam decision simply upheld 
a general rule regarding the plaintiff's right to appeal a remittitur 
decision. 53 Evidently, the Court assumed that the constitionality of 
remittitur was established and did not require discussion. 54 Modern 
federal courts now act on the assumption that the procedure is a 
constitutionally acceptable means of reducing extraordinarily large 
jury verdicts. 55 
Although the constitutionality of remittitur is generally accepted, 
the procedure still involves assessment of the weight and credibility 
of the evidence, a process that traditionally belongs to the jury. 56 
Motivated in part by this concern, the Missouri Supreme Court 
reconsidered the practice of remittitur in Firestone v. Crown Center 
Redevelopment Corporation. 57 In Firestone, a 34-year old woman 
sustained serious injuries when the suspended sidewalk in a hotel 
collapsed. 58 The jury awarded $15 million to the plaintiff. 59 The trial 
court reduced the award to $12.75 million. 60 Finding sufficient sup-
port in the evidence for the original jury award, the Missouri Su-
preme Court reinstated the verdict. 61 The court further decided to 
abolish the practice of remittitur in Missouri. 62 In support of its 
50 [d . 
• ;! See id. at 484-85. 
52 429 U.S. 648 (1977) (per curiam). 
5:1 [d. at 649. 
54 See id. 
55 Sam's Style Shop v. Cosmos Broadcasting Corp., 694 F.2d 998, 1005 (5th Cir. 1982); 
Doralee Estates v. Cities Service Oil Co., 569 F.2d 716, 722 (2d Cir. 1977); Campus Sweater 
& Sportswear Co. v. M.B. Kahn Constr. Co., 515 F. Supp. 64, 103 (D.S.C. 1979), afl'd mem., 
644 F.2d 877 (4th Cir. 1981). 
56 See supra note 39 and infra note 65 and accompanying text. 
57 693 S.W.2d 99 (Mo. 1985) (en bane). 
'oX [d. at 108-09. 
og [d. at 108. 
ou [d. 
61 [d. at 110. 
62 [d. For discussion of the abolishment of remittitur in Missouri see Note, The Abolishment 
of Remittitur: A Response of the Missouri Supreme Court. Firestone v. Crown Center, 51 
Mo. L. REV. 563 (1986); Comment, The Missouri Aberration: Abolition of Remittitur Fire-
stone v. Crown Redevelopment Corp., 30 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 1195 (1986); Note, Remittitur 
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conclusion, the Firestone court pointed to the "problems and conflict-
ing philosophies associated with the remittitur practice"63 that have 
resulted in "irreconcilable case by case evaluations. "64 
The court also quesioned the constitutionality of the practice by 
stating that remittitur involves "an assumption of a power to weigh 
the evidence, a function reserved to the trier(s) of fact."65 Recogniz-
ing that there was still a need to control jury verdicts, the court 
emphasized that a new trial motion was an available and appropriate 
means to address that problem in the future. 66 
Missouri's abolishment of remittitur serves as a reminder to courts 
that remittitur is still in a constitutionally gray area. Consequently, 
remittitur should be applied with circumspection,67 and its purported 
constitutionality should not serve as a license for reducing a jury 
verdict whenever the verdict is different from a verdict the judge 
would have awarded. 68 
c. Modern Use of Remittitur 
The rationale underlying remittitur is the promotion of judicial 
economy.69 Considering that the only alternative procedure to rem-
edy an excessive verdict is a new trial,70 courts regard remittitur as 
an expedient resolution that conserves judicial resources and reduces 
the legal costs of the parties. 71 As the Eighth Circuit explained in 
Abolished as an Unnecessary Practice Leading to Inconsistent Results, 64 WASH. U.L.Q. 
271 (1986). 
6.1 693 S.W.2d at 110. 
64 Id. 
65Id. 
66Id. 
B7 Doralee Estates v. Cities Service Oil Co., 596 F.2d 716, 722 (2d Cir. 1977) ("Remittitur, 
although reconcilable with the seventh amendment, is an expedient to be employed with 
circumspection.") (footnote omitted); Bonura v. Sea Land Service, Inc., 505 F.2d 665,669 (5th 
Cir. 1974) ("A district judge's discretion as to remittitur is circumscribed by the Seventh 
Amendment: He must not substitute his judgment of damages for that of the jury."). 
68 See Delesdernier v. Porterie, 666 F.2d 116, 124 (5th Cir. 1982); Rawson v. Sears, Roebuck 
and Co., 615 F. Supp. 1546, 1551 (D.C. Colo. 1985); Herman v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., 
379 F. Supp. 1268, 1277 (D. V.I. 1974). 
69 United States v. 47.14 Acres of Land, More or Less, 674 F.2d 722, 728 (8th Cir. 1982); 
see also Hendrix v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 776 F.2d 1492, 1507 (11th Cir. 1985) ("remit-
titur ... not only accomplishes justice but also promotes economy for the courts and parties"); 
Remittitur of Punitive Damages, supra note 14, at 824 ("The rationale behind remittitur is 
judicial economy: if the verdict seems excessive, but not so excessive that it appears the jury 
was influenced by passion or prejudice, it is more efficient to give the plaintiff the option of a 
reduced verdict than to unconditionally grant a new trial.") (footnotes omitted). 
70 United States v. 47.14 Acres of Land, 674 F.2d at 729. 
71 I d. at 728. 
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deciding the propriety of an award for future medical expenses in 
an asbestos-related case, "[t]he use of remittitur enables the court 
and the parties to avoid the delay and expense of a new trial, and 
. . . furthers the legitimate objective of bringing litigation to as 
speedy and expeditious end as is reasonable. "72 
Because of the current concern with tort reform and with the 
increasing size of jury verdicts,73 the American Bar Association re-
cently advocated a more expansive use of remittitur in lieu of sta-
tutory ceilings on non-economic damages such as pain and suffering. 74 
In its report, the ABA's Action Commission to Improve the Tort 
Liability System suggested that courts using remittitur should rely 
upon the standard used by the state courts of N ew York. 75 That 
standard dictates that an award is excessive if it "shocks the judicial 
conscience. "76 This is already the prevailing standard in federal 
courts. 77 The Commission also approved of the assertive approach 
taken by the N ew York courts in reviewing awards that are appar-
ently excessive. 78 
In order to achieve consistency in damage assessments, the Com-
mission recommends that tort award commissions should be estab-
lished. 79 These commissions would review and compile information 
on tort awards, and then "educate judges and attorneys on patterns 
and trends" in jury verdicts. 80 According to the Commission, such 
information would serve as guidelines in determining appropriate 
damage awards. 81 The Commission also recommends that more guid-
72 HendriJ', 776 F.2d at 1507 (quoting 6A J. MOORE, J. LUCAS & G. GROTHEER, MOORE'S 
FEDERAL PRACTICE ~ 59.08[7), at 59-189 (2d ed. 1985)) (footnote omitted). 
n TORT SYSTEM REPORT, supra note 9, at 14; see also Geller & Levy, The Constitutionality 
of Punitive Damages, 73 A.B.A. J. 88, 90 (Dec. 1987) (this is a "time of crisis and reform in 
the nation's tort system"). 
74 TORT SYSTEM REPORT, supm note 9, at 13. Although not articulated, a possible reason 
for concluding that remittitur was the solution to the problem of excessive and inconsistent 
verdicts rather than statutory ceilings, is that the commission did not perceive the problem 
to be severe enough to require rigid statutory guidelines. See id. ("If ... credible evidence 
emerges in the future that the average size of verdicts is continuing to rise at an excessive 
rate and that relatively few large verdicts are consuming an increasingly large proportion of 
the total amount awarded in tort cases, some members of the Commission think that a case 
for ceilings might well be made out."). 
7.; Id. at 13-14. 
'" Id. (citing Miner v. Long Island Lighting Co., 47 A.D.2d 842,365 N.Y.S.2d 873 (1975), 
rev'd on other grounds, 40 N.Y.2d 372,386 N.Y.S.2d 842,353 N.E.2d 805 (1976)). 
77 See infm note 89 and accompanying text. 
7B See TORT SYSTEM REPORT, supra note 9, at 13-14. 
79Id. at 14. 
Hi'Id. 
Kl See id. at 14-15. 
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ance should be provided to juries when they assess damages for pain 
and suffering in order to achieve greater uniformity in damage 
awards. 82 
The Commission, however, failed to explain why uniformity in tort 
awards is such an important goal. Because of differing community 
standards and the unique circumstances of each case, uniformity 
appears to be a difficult goal to achieve. 83 Furthermore, allowing the 
court to suggest ranges of "appropriate" awards would grant consid-
erable power to the court to influence the jury to determine awards 
according to the court's assessment of the damages. 84 This would 
constitute an infringement on the jury's role as trier of fact. 85 
D. The Procedural Steps of Remittitur 
1. At the Trial Level 
The remittitur process usually comes into play when the defendant 
moves for a new trial on grounds that the jury verdict is excessive. 86 
The moving party may ask for a new trial and for a remittitur in the 
alternative. 87 When presented with this motion, the first issue the 
trial judge must decide is whether the award is excessive. 88 
In deciding whether a verdict is excessive, the standard used by 
most courts is whether a damage award is so grossly excessive as 
to "shock the judicial conscience."89 Underlying this standard is the 
'2Id. at 15. 
"" See infra notes 173-74 and accompanying text. 
'" See TORT SYSTEM REPORT, supra note 9, at 15. 
S., See id. By suggesting guidelines, the court is imposing its assessment of the damages 
upon the jury. 
," MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ~ 59.08[7], supra note 2, at 59-185-186; see also Strathmere 
v. Karavas, 100 F.R.D. 478, 478-79 (D. Ariz. 1984) (defendants moved for a new trial on 
grounds that both the compensatory and punitive damages awarded were excessive and the 
court ordered a conditional new trial upon refusal to a reduction in both awards); Ealy v. 
Richardson-Merrell, Inc., No. 83-3504, slip op. at 2 (D.D.C. Oct. 1, 1987) (defendant moved 
for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict as to liability, or, in the alternative, a new trial 
or remittitur as to the compensatory and punitive damages). 
H7 E.g., Pellegrin v. Ray McDermott & Co., 504 F.2d 884,885 (5th Cir. 1974). 
Hil Remittitur Practice, supra note 2, at 302. For cases stating that the remittitur process 
begins with a determination as to whether the damages awarded are excessive or not see 
American Business Interiors, Inc. v. Haworth, Inc., 798 F.2d 11.35, 1146 (8th Cir. 1986); 
Spence V. Board of Educ. of Christina School Dist., 806 F.2d 1198, 1201 (3d Cir. 1986); Fenner 
V. Dependable Trucking Co., 716 F.2d 598, 603 (9th Cir. 1983). 
K9 Williams V. Martin Marietta Alumina, Inc., 817 F.2d 1030, 1038 (3d Cir. 1987); O'Gilvie 
v. International Playtex, Inc., 821 F.2d 1438, 1448 (10th Cir. 1987): Ouachita National Bank 
V. Tosco Corp., 716 F.2d 485, 488 (8th Cir. 1983) (en banc). Other phrases used by the circuits 
to describe this standard are: "grossly excessive"; "inordinate"; "outrageously excessive"; and 
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presumption that the jury verdict is correct.90 In order to overcome 
this presumption, there must be a "clear showing that the amount 
of the verdict is the product of passion, bias, corruption, or other 
improper motive. "91 If the district court finds a sufficient basis in the 
evidence independent of these motives, then the jury's verdict should 
be upheld. 92 In determining whether a jury verdict shocks the judi-
cial conscience, some courts apply a reasonable person standard. 93 
Under this standard, an excessive award is one that clearly exceeds 
"that amount that any reasonable [person] could feel the claimant is 
entitled to. "94 
If the moving party does not request a remittitur in the alterna-
tive, the trial court has the discretion to condition the denial of a 
motion for a new trial upon consent to a remittitur.95 Ordinarily, a 
court may not order a remittitur without affording the party opposed 
to the remittitur the alternative of a new trial. 96 Unconditionally 
ordering a reduction in the damages would be an encroachment upon 
the parties' constitutional right to a jury trial. 97 
Although a trial court should offer the plaintiff a remittitur in the 
alternative in most cases,98 when the trial court finds that the jury's 
determination of liability "was the product of undue passion or prej-
"monstrous." Bridges v. Groendyke Transport, Inc., 553 F.2d 877, 880 n.l (5th Cir. 1977). 
See also Webb V. City of Chester, Illinois, 813 F.2d 824, 836 (7th Cir. 1987) ("Trial judges 
may vacate a jury verdict for excessiveness only if it is 'monstrously excessive' .... " (quoting 
Joan W. v. City of Chicago, 771 F.2d 1020, 1023 (7th Cir. 1985) (citation omitted))); Caldarera 
V. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 705 F.2d 778, 784 (5th Cir. 1983) ("We have expressed the extent 
of distortion that warrants intervention by requiring such awards to be so large as to 'shock 
the judicial conscience,' .... "). 
"" See Bonura V. Sea Land Service, Inc., 505 F.2d 665, 669 (5th Cir. 1974). 
91Id. 
H2 Zeno V. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 803 F.2d 178, 181 (5th Cir. 1986). In Zeno, 
the Fifth Circuit upheld the district court's denial of remittitur since it found that the jury 
had a sufficient basis independent of bias or other improper motive for arriving at the amount 
that it did. I d. 
9" See, e.g., Caldarera, 705 F.2d at 784. 
94Id. (quoting Bridges V. Groendyke Transport, Inc., 553 F.2d 877, 880 (5th Cir. 1977) 
(emphasis in original)). 
95 Bonura V. Sea Land Service, Inc., 505 F.2d 665, 669 (5th Cir. 1974); Campus Sweater & 
Sportswear CO. V. M.B. Kahn Constr. Co., 515 F. Supp. 64, 103 (D.S.C. 1979), afl'd mem., 
644 F.2d 877 (4th Cir. 1981). 
9" McKinnon v. City of Berwyn, 750 F.2d 1383, 1391-92 (7th Cir. 1984); Kline V. Wolf, 702 
F.2d 400,405 (2d Cir. 1983); Higgins v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 716 F.2d 278,281 (5th Cir. 1983). 
9. O'Gilvie V. International Playtex, Inc., 821 F.2d 1438, 1447 (10th Cir. 1987); Carter V. 
District of Columbia, 795 F.2d 116, 134 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (quoting 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2815, at 99 (1973)); MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, 
supra note 2, ~I 59.08[7), at 59-200. 
9B Kazan V. Walinski, 721 F.2d 911, 914 (3d Cir. 1983); Higgins, 716 F.2d at 280-81. 
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udice" it must order a new trial. 99 This may be the case where, for 
example, plaintiff's counsel made inflammatory statements in closing 
argument that could have infected the jury's decision of liability as 
well as motivating the jury members to award an extraordinary 
verdict. 10o As the Supreme Court explained in one of its earlier 
decisions involving remittitur, "[ w ]here such motives or influences 
appear to have operated, the verdict must be rejected, because the 
effect is to cast suspicion upon the conduct of the jury and their 
entire finding. "101 
Unless the district court finds that the jury was motivated im-
properly when it decided liability, the trial court has the following 
options when it concludes that a jury's verdict is excessive: 1) enter 
an unconditional order for a new trial; 2) enter an unconditional 
order for a new trial on the issue of damages only; or 3) enter a 
conditional order for a new trial upon denial to a remittitur. 102 
When a court offers remittitur in the alternative, the plaintiff has 
two options: consenting to the remittitur or electing to proceed with 
a new trial. 103 In electing the new trial option, the plaintiff should 
consider the expense of a new trial and the possibility that after the 
second trial, the defendant could again move for a new trial or a 
remittitur in the alternative.104 Submitting to a new trial is not only 
expensive and risky in that the defendant could again initiate the 
remittitur process, but the plaintiff also runs the risk of a lower jury 
verdict or not recovering anything at all. 105 
99 Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 512 F.2d 276, 283 (5th Cir. 1975) (citation omitted); 
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 2, 11 59.08[7], at 59-199. 
IOU Edwards, 512 F.2d at 283. Edwards involved a wrongful death action arising from an 
automobile accident caused by defective tires. Id. at 279. The jury awarded the plaintiff 
$900,000. Id. at 280. On a motion for a new trial, the judge found the award excessive and 
ordered a remittitur of $450,000. Id. In concluding that a new trial was necessary to cure the 
excessive verdict, the appellate court found that inflammatory statements, such as those 
evoking the image of the deceased's children crying at his graveside, made by plaintiff's 
counsel during closing statements, were "so calculated to prejudice the defendants" that they 
constituted more than harmless error. Id. at 285-86. See also Remittitur of Punitive Damages, 
supra note 14, at 827 ("Remittitur cannot adequately cure these excesses, for the passion or 
prejudice tainting the jury's assessment of damages may have infected its decision on liability 
as well."). 
101 Arkansas Valley Land and Cattle Co. v. Mann, 130 U.S. 69, 715 (1888) (quoting Stafford 
v. Pawtucket Haircloth Co., 22 F. Cas. 1030 (C.C.D. R.l. 1862) (No. 13,275)). 
102 See Fenner v. Dependable Trucking Co., Inc., 716 F.2d 598,608 (9th Cir. 1983); MOORE'S 
FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 2, 11 59.08[7], at 59-193; Remittitur Practice, supra note 2, 
at 304. 
108 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 2, 11 59.08[7], at 59-199; Remittitur of Punitive 
Damages, supra note 14, at 828. 
104 See Remittitur Practice, supra note 2, at 313. 
105 See, e.g., Spence v. Board of Educ. of Christina School Dist., 806 F.2d 1198 (3d Cir. 
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When the court has either unconditionally ordered a new trial or 
confined the proceedings to the issue of damages only, the plaintiff 
can only appeal after the new trials.106 It is unlikely that the trial 
judge will order a new trial unless the judge believes that the jury's 
determination of liability was motivated by passion or prejudice.107 
Given that trial judges prefer remittitur for its efficacy,108 it is more 
likely that the court would offer the plaintiff a remittitur. 
If the plaintiff accepts a reduced award, the party seeking the 
remittitur may appeal the amount remitted by the trial court by 
claiming that it is legally improper.109 It is generally held, however, 
that the party accepting the remittitur cannot appeal the order. llO 
N either party may appeal an unconditional new trial order until after 
the new trial is conducted. III 
2. At the Appellate Level 
Remittitur is also available to appellate courts, primarily to excise 
any ascertainable portion of the damages resulting from a reversible 
error committed in the trial court. 112 When remittitur is used in this 
fashion, the appellate court may condition its affirmance of the plain-
tiff's verdict upon the plaintiff's consent to a remittitur of that 
portion of the damages attributable to the error. 113 To correct re-
1986). Spence involved a civil rights action by a teacher against her employer. Id. at 1199. At 
the initial trial, the jury awarded the plaintiff $25,000 in compensatory damages and $3,500 
in punitive damages against the principal of the high school where she had been teaching. Id. 
The district court offered the plaintiff a remittitur of $22,060 of the compensatory damages 
or a new trial on both the issues of damages and liability. Id. The plaintiff elected the new 
trial option. Id. At the new trial, the jury returned a verdict for the defendants. Id. The 
appellate court affirmed both the new trial order and the verdict from the second trial. Id. 
Reinertsen v. George W. Rogers Constr. Corp., 519 F.2d 531 (2d Cir. 1975). In Reinertsen, 
the jury awarded $75,000 to the plaintiff, which the trial court reduced to $45,000 upon 
condition that the plaintiff forego a new trial. I d. at 532. The plaintiff chose instead to try the 
case again, and at the second trial, the jury only awarded $16,000. Id. 
106 CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 2, § 12.4, at 558; Remittitur Practice, supra note 2, at 
312. 
107 See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text. 
108 See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text. 
109 CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 2, § 12.4, at 558. 
110 Donovan v. Penn Shipping Co., Inc., 429 U.S. 648, 650 (1977); MOORE'S FEDERAL 
PRACTICE, supra note 2, ~ 59.08[7], at 59-205. Although the plaintiff may not appeal a 
remittitur order he or she has refused, it is possible to appeal that order after judgment is 
rendered in the second trial. E.g., Evans v. Calmar Steamship Co., 534 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 
1976); Taylor v. Washington Terminal Co., 409 F.2d 145, 147 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 
U.S. 835 (1969). 
111 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 2, ~ 59.15[1], at 59-315-317. 
112 I d. at 59-208. 
113 Id. 
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versible error, an appellate court may also order a remittitur uncon-
ditionally. For example, in Hendrix v. Raybestos-Manhattan, the 
district court had instructed the jury to award future medical ex-
penses when no evidence on the issue was presented during the 
trial. 114 Rather than ordering a new trial on the issue of damages, 
the appellate court ordered a relatively small reduction of that part 
of the award that included future medical expenses. 115 
Federal appellate courts also review remittitur decisions of district 
courts. Appellate review is based on the assumption that the trial 
judge is in the best position to decide on a remittitur.116 Unlike the 
appellate court, the trial judge has the benefit of observing the trial 
first-hand and is more familiar with the community and its stan-
dards. 117 Consequently, federal appellate courts are hesitant to sub-
stitute their view for the trial judge's, especially when the damages 
awarded are based upon the special circumstanceR of the case such 
as damages for grief and emotional distress. 118 Deference to the trial 
court's decision is even stronger when the court has decided not to 
grant a remittitur; the judge's agreement with the jury creates a 
stronger presumption that the award is correct. 119 Therefore, the 
scope of review on appeal is strict,120 and a trial court's ruling on 
remittitur will only be reversed when there is a manifest abuse of 
discretion. 121 
114 Hendrix v. Raybestos-Manhattan, 776 F.2d 1492, 1507 (11th Cir. 1985). 
115 I d. at 1508. 
116 Vanskike v. Union Pac. R.R., 725 F.2d 1146, 1149 (8th Cir. 1984); Spence v. Board of 
Educ. of Christina School Dist., 806 F.2d 1198, 1201 (3d Cir. 1986). 
117 Vanskike, 725 F.2d at 1149 (quoting Solomon Dehydrating Co. v. Guyton, 294 F.2d 439, 
447-48 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 929 (1961)). 
I" Caldarera v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 705 F.2d 778, 783-84 (5th Cir. 1983); see also 
Vanskike, 725 F.2d at 1150 ("An appellate court should be extremely hesitant to overturn a 
verdict which includes damages for pain and suffering."). 
119 Webb v. City of Chester, Illinois, 813 F.2d 824, 836 (7th Cir. 1987); see also Carter v. 
Duncan-Huggins, Ltd., 727 F.2d 1225, 1239 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (when a district judge refuses to 
remit damages, the appellate court should only order a remittitur or a new trial if the award 
is "contrary to all reason" (quoting Taylor v. Washington Terminal Co., 409 F.2d 145, 148 
(D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 396 U.S. 835 (1969))) (emphasis omitted). 
Deference to the trial judge has been criticized for operating as a presumption in that it 
allows the trial judge to determine that an award is excessive without explaining his or her 
rationale or basis in the findings of fact. Bonura v. Sea Land Service, Inc., 512 F.2d 671, 672-
73 (5th Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (Goldberg, J., dissenting). Upholding trial judges on this basis 
has the effect of allowing them "onto the floor to dance with no choreographed design or 
articulated steps." Id. at 673. 
120 American Business Interiors, Inc. v. Haworth, 798 F.2d 1135, 1146 (8th Cir. 1986); 
Carter, 727 F.2d at 1238-39. 
121 See, e.g., American Business Interiors, 798 F.2d at 1146; K-B Trucking Co. v. Riss Int'l 
Corp., 763 F.2d 1148, 1162 (10th Cir. 1985). 
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Appellate review of a lower court's remittitur decision is a two-
step process. Rather than determining outright whether the correct 
amount was remitted, the reviewing court must first decide whether 
the trial court was acting within its discretion in ordering the re-
mittitur.122 It is an abuse of discretion for the trial court to order a 
remittitur when the jury's verdict is clearly within a reasonable 
range of awards supported by the evidence. 123 Once the appellate 
court decides that the trial court's actions were proper under the 
first step, then the court may determine whether the appropriate 
amount was remitted. 124 Under the prevailing view, the amount of 
the award remaining after remittitur should reflect the maximum 
possible recovery supported by the evidence and not merely the trial 
court's opinion of what constitutes an appropriate award. 125 
Although remittitur is primarily a discretionary procedure left to 
the trial courts, there is an increasing appellate trend to review 
damage awards. 126 Federal appellate courts also have the power to 
remit large damage awards. 127 Appellate courts will not routinely 
review a jury verdict in every case,128 but only when they find that 
the award is "so gross or inordinately large as to be contrary to right 
reason,"129 or "so exaggerated as to indicate 'bias, passion, prejudice, 
corruption, or other improper motive. "'130 
122 Bonura v. Sea Land Service, Inc., 505 F.2d 665, 670 (5th Cir. 1974). 
123 Delesdernier v. Porterie, 666 F.2d 116, 123 (5th Cir. 1982). 
124 [d. at 123-24. 
125 [d. (quoting Bonura, 512 F.2d at 670). As stated by Justice Story in Thurston v. Martin: 
"It is one thing for a court to administer its own measure of damages in a case properly before 
it, and quite another thing to set aside the verdict of a jury because it exceeds that measure." 
23 Fed. Cas. 1189, 1190 (C.C.D. R.1. 1830) (No. 14,018) quoted with approval in Rawson v. 
Sears, Roebuck and Co., 615 F. Supp. 1546, 1551 (D.C. Colo. 1985); see also Herman v. Hess 
Oil Virgin Islands Corp., 379 F. Supp. 1268, 1277 (D.V.1. 1974) ("I cannot merely substitute 
my opinion as to the appropriate sum without infringing upon the plaintiff's constitutional 
right to trial by jury. "). 
126 Williams v. Martin Marietta Alumina, Inc., 817 F.2d 1030, 1041 (3d Cir. 1987); see also 
Gumbs v. Pueblo Int'l, Inc., 823 F.2d 768, 773 (3d Cir. 1987) (there is "increasing willingness 
of the appellate courts to review damages awards"). 
127 E.g., Springborn v. American Commercial Barge Lines, Inc., 767 F.2d 89, 96 n.20 (5th 
Cir. 1985). 
128 Vanskike v. Union Pac. R.R., 725 F.2d 1146, 1149-50 (8th Cir. 1984) (quoting Solomon 
Dehydrating Co. v. Guyton, 294 F.2d 439, 447-448 (8th Cir.), cert' denied, 368 U.S. 929 
(1961». 
129 Caldarera v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 705 F.2d 778, 784 (5th Cir. 1983); see also Sam's 
Style Shop v. Cosmos Broadcasting Corp., 694 F.2d 998,1006 (5th Cir. 1982) ("[Blefore setting 
aside a verdict as excessive, we must make a detailed appraisal of the evidence bearing on 
damages and be satisfied that the award is completely without support in the record and 
evidences prejudice or speculation rather than a reasonable view of the evidence .... "). 
130 Caldarera, 705 F.2d at 784 (quoting A~len v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 623 F.2d 355,364 
(5th Cir. 1980». 
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When a federal appellate court decides that there should be a 
remittitur, it "may choose either 'to determine the maximum award 
which the evidence could support and suggest a remittitur to that 
level, or to remand to the trial court for it to do so. "'131 In most 
cases, appellate courts remand the calculation of remittitur to the 
trial court. This practice is based on the assumption that the trial 
court has first-hand familiarity with the evidence, and is therefore 
in a better position to reevaluate the award. 132 
On appeal, calculating the amount of remittitur is relatively simple 
in cases where the defects in the award are readily ascertainable. 133 
For example, in Sam's Style Shop v. Cosmos Broadcasting Corp., 134 
the jury awarded the owner of a business $50,000 for the cost of a 
television commercial and for lost profits resulting from the refusal 
of the television station to air the commercial. 135 The court found 
this excessive because the commercial only cost $2,400 to produce. 136 
In these cases, appellate remittitur seems readily justifiable because 
"[a]djustment of the award is fairly mechanical and does not interfere 
with the jury's function."137 
Remittitur becomes a more speculative procedure, especially at 
the appellate level, when subjective damages, such as awards for 
pain and suffering and punitive damages, are involved. 138 Calculating 
an appropriate amount of non-economic damages requires more than 
rational analysis. 139 Reassessment is a subjective process that in-
volves "experience and emotions as well as calculation."14o Because 
131 Hendrix v. Raybestos-Manhattan, 776 F.2d 1492, 1507 (11th Cir. 1985) (quoting Howell 
v. Marmpegaso Compania Naviera, 536 F.2d 1032, 1034-35 (5th Cir. 1976)). 
132 E.g., Sosa v. MIV Lago Izabel, 736 F.2d 1028, 1035 (5th Cir. 1984); Hyde v. Chevron 
USA, Inc., 697 F.2d 614, 632 (5th Cir. 1983). 
133 Kolb v. Goldring, Inc., 694 F.2d 869,875 (lst Cir. 1982). 
134 694 F.2d 998, 1000 (5th Cir. 1982). 
135Id. 
136Id. 
137 Kolb, 694 F.2d at 875. 
138 See Caldarera, 705 F.2d at 783-84; see also Doralee Estates v. Cities Service Oil Co., 
569 F.2d 716, 723 (2d Cir. 1977) ("punitive damages by their nature do not admit of precise 
determination .... "); Campus Sweater & Sportswear Co. v. M.B. Kahn Constr. Co., 515 F. 
Supp. 64, 106 (D.S.C. 1979), a/I'd mem., 644 F.2d 877 (4th Cir. 1981) ("The admonitory 
function of punitive damages does not lend itself to formulation."). 
139 Caldarera, 705 F.2d at 784. The plaintiff in Caldarera brought a wrongful death action 
against Eastern Airlines for the deaths of his wife, son and mother in an airplane crash. Id. 
at 784-85. In reviewing the district court's remittitur, the court stated, "[r leassessment cannot 
be supported entirely by rational analysis. It is inherently subjective in large part .... " Id. 
at 784. See also Dixon v. International Harvester Co., 754 F.2d 573,590 (5th Cir. 1985) ("Our 
reassessment of damages cannot be supported entirely by rational analysis .... "). 
140 Dixon, 754 F.2d at 590. 
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this is the primary function of the jury, reevaluation of non-economic 
damages on appeal seems less justifiable. 141 For this reason, it has 
been argued that the assessment of damages not easily calculable in 
economic terms is especially within the province of the jury and 
should generally not be disturbed by appellate courts. 142 
3. Guidelines Used by Federal Courts 
There are several guidelines used by federal courts in determining 
the appropriate amount of remittitur. No uniform standard exists 
by which the federal courts can determine the correct amount to be 
remitted. 143 Although federal law supposedly governs the proper role 
of federal courts in reviewing the size of jury verdicts in diversity 
cases,144 it is not clear whether federal or state law controls the 
decision on how much to remit. 145 Without any clear standard, federal 
courts have tended to rely on state law for guidance. 146 Several 
standards are currently valid but offer little in the way of consis-
tency.147 
A general guideline known as the "maximum recovery rule" is the 
prevailing standard that courts rely upon in making remittitur de-
cisions. 148 According to this rule, a court should only remit damages 
141 See Hulett v. Brinson, 229 F.2d 22, 25 (D.C. Cir. 1955). 
142 See, e.g., Stafford v. Neurological Medicine, Inc., 811 F.2d 470,475 (8th Cir. 1987) ("[T)he 
assessment of damages is especially within the jury's sound discretion when the jury must 
determine how to compensate an individual for an injury not easily calculable in economic 
terms .... "); Vanskike v. Union Pac. R. R., 725 F.2d 1146, 1150 (8th Cir. 1984) ("An appellate 
court should be extremely hesitant to overturn a verdict which includes damages for pain and 
suffering."); Doralee Estates v. Cities Service Oil Co., 569 F.2d 716,722 (2d Cir. 1977) ("Since 
punitive damages by their nature do not admit of precise determination, their evaluation is 
properly within the discretionary province of the jury .... "). 
143 See CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 2, § 12.4, at 557; MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra 
note 2, ~ 59.08[7), at 59-194-95; Remittitur of Punitive Damages, supra note 14, at 827-28; 
Remittitur Practice, supra note 2, at 299. 
144 Donovan v. Penn Shipping Co., 429 U.S. 648, 649 (l977); accord American Business 
Interiors, Inc. v. Haworth, Inc., 798 F.2d 1135, 1146 (8th Cir. 1986); K-B Trucking Co. v. 
Riss Int'l Corp., 763 F.2d 1148, 1162 (10th Cir. 1985); Kazan v. Wolinski, 721 F.2d 911, 913 
(3d Cir. 1983); Warren v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 693 F.2d 1373, 1379 (11th Cir. 1982). 
145 See CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 2, § 12.4; Remittitur Practice, supra note 2, at 308-
09; Remittitur of Punitive Damages, supra note 14, at 829--30. 
146 See, e.g., American Business Interiors, Inc. v. Haworth, Inc., 798 F.2d 1135, 1146 (8th 
Cir. 1986); La Vay Corp. v. Dominion Federal Say. & Loan Ass'n, 645 F. Supp. 612, 616 (E.D. 
Va. 1986). 
147 See infra notes 148-72 and accompanying text. 
148 Hendrix v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 776 F.2d 1497, 1507 (11th Cir. 1983); Caldarera 
v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 705 F.2d 778, 784 (5th Cir. 1983); K-B Trucking Co. v. Riss Int'l 
Corp., 763 F.2d 1148, 1163 (lOth Cir. 1985); D & S Redi-Mix v. Sierra Redi-Mix & Contracting 
Co., 692 F.2d 1245 (9th Cir. 1982). 
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in excess of the maximum award supported by the evidence. 149 Al-
though this rule is the least favorable to defendants,150 it is consid-
ered the only theory that has any reasonable claim of consistency 
with the seventh amendment. 151 Theoretically, the maximum recov-
ery rule requires the least interference with the jury's verdict. 152 
The opposite of the maximum recovery rule is the legally sufficient 
minimum standard. 153 It is a standard still recognized by legal com-
mentators.154 It is, however, not prevalent iIi current federal case 
law, and has been abolished in Wisconsin, where the standard orig-
inated. 155 
Another standard is that a damage figure is reasonable if it falls 
within a reasonable range that the judge finds the evidence justi-
fies. 156 Under this standard the figure determined by the trial judge 
does not necessarily have to reflect the maximum possible recov-
ery.157 
There are also several other guidelines used by federal courts in 
making remittitur decisions. Some courts consider proportionality 
when calculating the amount of an award that should be remitted. 15s 
For example, in some jurisdictions the amount of punitive damages 
should be proportional to compensatory damages. 159 This is true in 
Texas where in certain cases the courts find that punitive damages 
equal to three times the amount of compensatory damages is a "fairly 
149 E.g., Zeno v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 803 F.2d 178, 181 (5th Cir. 1986); 
Hendrix, 776 F.2d at 1507. Under the maximum recovery rule, remittitur can only "reduce a 
verdict to the 'maximum amount the jury could have properly awarded.'" Id. (quoting Cal-
darera, 705 F.2d at 784). 
150 Zeno, 803 F.2d at 181 n.2. 
151 K-B Trucking, 763 F.2d at 1162 n.21 (quoting 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2815, at 104-05 (1973)). 
152Id. 
153 CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 2, § 12.4, at 558. Under this standard, a court can reduce 
the verdict to the minimum amount that the jury could have awarded; thus, it is more favorable 
to defendants. Id. 
154 See id. 
155 Powers v. Allstate Ins. Co., 10 Wis. 2d 78, 102 N.W.2d 393 (1960). 
156 CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 2, § 12.4, at 558 (citing Maxey v. Freightliner Corp., 722 
F.2d 1288 (5th Cir.), modified, 727 F.2d 350 (5th Cir. 1984)). 
157Id. 
158 See Ogilvie v. Fotomat Corp., 641 F.2d 581, 586 (8th Cir. 1981) (the Eighth Circuit upheld 
the district court's finding that punitive damages awarded for loss of business to frachisee 
were "irrational and excessive," and that reduction of punitive damages awarded for each 
store to four times the amount of compensatory damages was reasonable). 
159 See, e.g., Stewart & Stevenson Services, Inc. v. Pickard, 749 F.2d 635, 651 (11th Cir. 
1984) ("Texas law requires that 'the amount of exemplary damages should be reasonably 
proportionate to the actual damages found.'" (quoting Southwestern Investment Co. v. Neeley, 
452 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. 1970))). 
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good standard. "160 Other courts consider proportionality in terms of 
whether the award is proportional to the injury sustained. 161 Under 
this approach, there must be a "reasonable relationship"162 or "ra-
tional connection"16:3 between the injury sustained and the damages 
awarded. Presumptively, a disproportionate award on its face raises 
suspicion of prejudice or partiality. 164 
Commentators in Pennsylvania, where the reasonable relationship 
rule exists, have criticized the rule because the "purpose of punitive 
damages is to punish the defendant for his outrageous conduct and 
to deter the defendant and others from the commission of like acts 
... ,[and] the size of the compensatory damage award itself bears 
no logical relation to accomplishing [this function],"165 
Although remittitur practice in diversity cases is supposedly gov-
erned by federal law, 166 federal courts are sometimes guided by state 
substantive law in deciding how much, if any, of a jury verdict should 
be remitted. 167 This is usually the case when punitive damages are 
involved, since there are no federal laws or policies to guide federal 
courts in determining the propriety of punitive damage awards. 168 
160 E.g., Maxey v. Freightliner Corp., 722 F.2d 1238, 1242 (5th Cir. 1984). 
161 See, e.g., Zeno v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 803 F.2d 178, 181 (5th Cir. 1986) 
(jury damage awards should only be changed if they are "entirely disproportionate to the 
injury sustained"). In Virginia, punitive damages must be "reasonably proportionate" to the 
actual injuries sustained. La Vay Corp. v. Dominion Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 645 F. Supp. 
612, 616-17 (E.D. Va. 1986). 
162 Ogilvie, 641 F.2d at 586 (citations omitted); see also Hughes v. Box, 814 F.2d 498, 504 
(8th Cir. 1987). In rejecting the defendant's argument that punitive damages were excessive 
because they amounted to fifteen percent of his net worth, the Hughes court stated that there 
must be a reasonable relationship between the actual injury to the plaintiff and the amount 
of punitive damages awarded but that no fixed numerical guideline was applicable in Missouri. 
Id. 
163 See, e.g., Albernathy v. Superior Hardwoods, Inc., 704 F.2d 963, 971 (7th Cir. 1983) 
("We ... would not set aside a jury's verdict as excessive unless there was no rational 
connection between the evidence on damages and the verdict .... "). 
164 LaVay, 645 F. Supp. at 617 (quoting Gazette, Inc. v. Harris, 325 S.E.2d 713, 747 (Va.), 
cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1032 (1985)). 
165 Surrick, Punitive Damages and Asbestos Litigation in Pennsylvania: Punishment or 
Annihilation?, 87 DICK. L. REV. 265, 284 (1983) (quoting Penn. Suggested Standard Civil 
Jury Instructions, Punitive Damages § 14.02 (Subcommittee Note)); see also Campus Sweater 
& Sportswear Co. v. M.B. Kahn Constr. Co., 515 F. Supp. 64, 106 (D.S.C. 1979), afl'd mem., 
644 F.2d 877 (4th Cir. 1981). In South Carolina, "[tlhe refusal to specify a ratio is due to the 
need to individualize punitive damage verdicts. One must look to behavior, not to results, to 
determine the need to admonish . . . ." I d. 
166 See supra note 144 and accompanying text. 
167 See, e.g., American Business Interiors, Inc. v. Haworth, Inc., 798 F.2d 1135, 1146 (8th 
Cir. 1986) ("We are guided by the law of the forum state in weighing the excessiveness of the 
verdict. "). 
168 See Kerr v. First Commodity Corp. of Boston, 735 F.2d 281, 288 (8th Cir. 1984). 
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Some federal courts would consider a jury verdict excessive if it is 
greater than what the state's highest court would sustain. 169 
Comparability to other awards for similar cases is another factor 
that some federal courts consider a helpful guideline in determining 
whether a jury's award is excessive. 170 A court may add the factor 
of comparability when the case under review is "[o]ne of a series of 
similar cases that establish a trend in damage awards .... "171 Using 
this factor, if an award before a judge is anomalous to verdicts 
awarded in similar cases, then the judge may remit that portion of 
the award that would bring it in line with the other awards. 172 The 
criticism of this approach is that it fails to take into account the 
unique circumstances of each case. 173 This criticism is based on the 
proposition that each jury is a different group of randomly selected 
individuals, so what one jury decided in one case may not be an 
accurate indication of what another jury should award in a similar 
case. 174 Furthermore, one party could cite cases that found a certain 
award excessive while the other could cite cases that found the 
opposite. 175 Therefore, a comparison to other jury verdicts in similar 
cases should be considered as a factor and not the sole basis for a 
decision to remit a portion of the damages. 
III. REMITTITUR IN ENVIRONMENTAL CASES 
A. The Function of Punitive Damages in Environmental 
Litigation 
In cases involving environmental issues, remittitur is most fre-
quently called upon to reduce large punitive damage awards. 176 Pu-
169 Vanskike, 725 F.2d at 1151. See also Ferren v. Richards Mfg. Co., 733 F.2d 526, 531 
(8th Cir. 1984) ("The Court cannot ... sustain damages awarded in excess of 'that which 
could be sustained were the case before the highest court of the state whose substantive law 
gives rise to the claim.'" (quoting Hysell v. Iowa Public Service Co., 559 F.2d 468, 472 (8th 
Cir. 1977))). 
170 See, e.g., Osburn v. Anchor Laboratories, Inc., 825 F.2d 908, 921 (5th Cir. 1987) (in 
upholding a jury award of $500,000 to the plaintiff's wife for loss of consortium, the court 
found comparable awards involving similar claims within the jurisdiction); Zeno v. Great 
Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 803 F.2d 178, 181 (5th Cir. 1986) (the court looked to cases 
awarding the greatest amounts of damages for similar injuries in determining whether the 
verdict was reasonable). 
171 Webb v. City of Chester, Illinois, 813 F.2d 824, 836 (7th Cir. 1987). Webb involved a 
wrongful discharge claim based on sex discrimination. The court found that there had been a 
trend of similar cases and used the damages awarded in those cases as a guideline in deter-
mining whether the jury's award was reasonable. After surveying awards in similar cases, 
the court decided that the plaintiff's award of $20,250 for embarrassment and humiliation was 
"not out of line with other awards in similar cases." Id. 
172 See id .. 
173 See Vanskike, 725 F.2d at 1150. The court found comparisons to other jury verdicts for 
similar injuries "not greatly helpful" since "each case must be evaluated as an individual one, 
within the framework of its distinctive facts." Id. 
174 See id. 
175 See id. 
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nitive damages have always been regarded as an anomaly in tort 
law. 177 Whereas the primary purpose of tort law is to compensate an 
injured victim, the function of punitive damages is to punish the 
wrongdoer. 178 Although punitive damages are not favored by the 
law,179 they serve several important functions. 18o These functions 
may be divided into four categories: (1) punishment; (2) deterrence 
and law enforcement; (3) retribution; and (4) compensation. 181 
One obvious function of punitive damages is to punish defendants 
and make public examples of them. 182 As a penalty for the irrespon-
sible behavior of a corporation, for example, punitive damages "serve 
to eliminate any competitive advantage that a defendant may have 
gained by misconduct and also eliminate any benefit that may have 
accrued to the defendant by trading safety for profit. "183 In this way, 
society, as well as the individual plaintiff, is afforded some retribu-
tion. 184 In their retributive function, exemplary damage awards rep-
appealed the punitive damage verdict of $2 million awarded to the city in its action against 
the defendant manufacturer of a fireproofing product containing asbestos); Cathey v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., 776 F.2d 1565 (6th Cir. 1985) (defendant appealed jury award of $1.5 
million in punitive damages to the plaintiff who suffered from asbestosis caused by defendant's 
insulation materials); Ealy v. Richardson-Merrell, No. 83-3504, slip op. at 2 (D.D.C. Oct. 1, 
1987) (defendant appealed both the compensatory damage award of $20 million and the punitive 
damage award of $75 million in a suit for birth defects caused by the anti-nausea drug, 
benedictin). 
According to one commentator, "there is a trend toward tighter judicial control over punitive 
awards." Seltzer, Punitive Damages in Mass Tort Litigation: Addressing the Problems of 
Fairness, Efficiency and Control, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 37, 50 (1983). 
177 See TORT SYSTEM REPORT, supra note 9, at 15; Owen, Punitive Damages in Product 
Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1258, 1267 (1976). According to Professor Owen, any 
expansion of the punitive damages doctrine would "meet with vehement objections emphasiz-
ing its many supposed flaws and 'anomalous' presence in the law of torts." Id. (footnotes 
omitted). See also Note. In Defense of Punitive Damages, 55 N.Y. U. L. REV. 303, 306 (1980) 
("At the heart of the criticism of punitive damages is the argument that they are an anomaly 
within the law of torts. ") (footnote omitted). 
17K See supra note 177. 
179 Knippen v. Ford Motor Co., 546 F.2d 993, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Not only are punitive 
damages considered anomalous, they have also been criticized as providing a "windfall" to the 
plaintiff; as punishing the defendant without the procedural safeguards of the fifth and sixth 
amendments; as being too subjective and unpredictable; and as posing a threat to the financial 
stability of a corporate defendant. See generally Owen, supra note 177; Surrick, supra note 
165; Seltzer, supra note 176. 
180 Punitive damages have been described as: a penalty for irresponsible conduct; a deterrent; 
retribution for the plaintiff and society; a reflection of society's rules and values; and additional 
compensation to the plaintiff that is otherwise unrecoverable under the heading of compen-
satory damages. See generally Surrick, supra note 165; Owen, supra note 177. 
181 Owen, supra note 177, at 1278. 
182 Kerr v. First Commodity Corp. of Boston, 735 F.2d 281, 289 (8th Cir. 1984); Sterling v. 
Velsicol Chemical Corp., 647 F. Supp. 303, 323 (W.D. Tenn. 1986). 
183 Surrick, supra note 165, at 295. 
1" See Owen, supra note 177, at 1279-82. 
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resent society's disapproval of the transgressions of its rules; they 
also reaffirm the commitment to societal standards and "educate[] 
violators and potential violators on society's rules and values."185 
Punitive damages are also an award to the plaintiff who has "per-
formed a public service by bringing the wrongdoer to account. "186 
Under the "private attorney general theory," the anticipation of a 
large punitive damage award operates as an incentive for reluctant 
plaintiffs to bring suit and enforce the law against wrongdoers. 187 
This is an important enforcement mechanism in environmental law 
since it reaches improper conduct that would otherwise go unpun-
ished in the criminal justice system. 188 
Punitive damages in environmental cases also serve an important 
role as a deterrent. 189 In this role, exemplary190 damage awards alert 
potential environmental perpetrators that trading environmental 
protection for profit now might result in having to pay more later. 
As stated by the court in Doralee Estates v. Cities Service Oil CO.:191 
"Exemplary damages are intended to inject an additional factor into 
the cost-benefit calculations of companies who might otherwise find 
it fiscally prudent to disregard the threat of liability. "192 Punitive 
damages, then, are an "open-ended" factor that corporations must 
take into consideration before deciding to operate in a manner that 
is threatening to the environment or before marketing a product 
that may be defective. 193 
185 Surrick, supra note 165, at 279 (citing Owen, supra note 177, at 1281). 
186 Richards v. Allstate Ins. Co., 693 F.2d 502, 506 (5th Cir. 1982) (citation omitted). 
187 Owen, supra note 177, at 1287-88. In order to recover punitive damages, the environ-
mental plaintiff must show that the defendant's conduct "'contains elements of intentional 
wrongdoing or conscious disregard' for plaintiff's rights." Knippen v. Ford Motor Co., 546 
F.2d 993, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (quoting Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 512 F.2d 527,547-
49 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 426 U.S. 290 (1976)). 
188 See Surrick, supra note 165, at 279 (citing Owen, supra note 177). Part of the reason for 
the lack of pursuit of environmental crimes is the limited resources available for the criminal 
investigation and prosecution of environmental crimes. See McMurry & Ramsey, Environ-
mental Crime: The Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Environmental Laws, 19 Loy. 
L.A.L. REV. 1133, 1144 (1986). 
189 See, e.g., Doralee Estates v. Cities Service Oil Co., 569 F.2d 716, 723 (2d Cir. 1977); 
Sterling v. Velsicol Chemical Corp., 647 F. Supp. 303, 323 (W.D. Tenn. 1986). 
190 "Punitive" damages and "exemplary" damages are interchangeable terms. Owen, supra 
note 177, at 1265 n.24. 
191 569 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1977). 
192Id. at 723. In Doralee Estates, the defendant oil company had discharged fuel into the 
plaintiffs' property where a bungalow colony was situated. The appellate court affirmed the 
$200,000 punitive damage verdict. 
193 Campus Sweater & Sportswear Co. v. M.B. Kahn Constr. Co., 515 F. Supp. 64, 107 
(D.S.C. 1979), aff'd mem., 644 F.2d 877 (4th Cir. 1981). 
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In order to function effectively, an award for punitive damages 
must be substantial enough to "smart" the wrongdoer. 194 According 
to the court in State v. Dayton Malleable, Inc.: 195 
To be an effective deterrent the penalty must be substantial and 
should exceed social and business costs of the violation. It will 
thus serve as a specific deterrent for future violations by the 
same individual, and will also serve a general deterrent function 
on an industry-wide basis throughout the regulatory scheme. I96 
Otherwise, a corporation would regard potential liability for certain 
actions as simply a cost of doing business. 197 
For this reason, evidence of a defendant's wealth is usually per-
missible in determining the appropriate amount of punitive dam-
ages. 198 If the defendant's wealth is a consideration that is made in 
determining the amount of punitive damages, then logically the de-
fendant's financial status should also be a consideration the court 
takes into account in reviewing the jury's verdict. In Dayton Malle-
able, the trial court considered the defendant's financial condition in 
determining the amount of the civil penalty.199 In rejecting the de-
fendant's argument that such a consideration was error, the Ohio 
appellate court stated that the "economic condition of the violator is 
an important factor in formulating a penalty based on the deterrent 
function."20o The rationale for considering a polluter's financial con-
dition is that a penalty levied on a small enterprise may be significant 
but the same penalty to a large business "may be no more than a 
194 Reynolds v. Pegler, 123 F. Supp. 36, 41 (S.D.N.Y. 1954), afl'd, 223 F.2d 429 (2d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 846 (1955), quoted with approval in Doralee Estates v. Cities Service 
Oil Co., 569 F.2d 716, 722 (2d Cir. 1977). 
195 11 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 21027 (Ohio Ct. App. 1981), modified on other grounds, 
1 Ohio St. 3d 151, 438 N.E.2d 120 (1982). 
196 Dayton Malleable, 11 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 21029. In Dayton Malleable, 
the court considered the propriety of a civil penalty award of $493,500 pursuant to the Ohio 
Clean Water Act. Id. at 21027. The penalty was based on the failure of Dayton Malleable, 
Inc. (DMI) to comply with the schedule for two of its points of discharge into the Ohio River. 
Id. at 21028. DMI also exceeded the effluent limits of its permit for total suspended solids. 
Id. 
Even though Dayton Malleable involved a judge-determined civil penalty, the factors 
considered by the court are similar to those that are relevant in determining the propriety of 
a punitive damage award in a private environmental suit. 
197 See Dayton Malleable, 11 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 21029; Starr, Countering 
Environmental Crimes, 13 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 379, 383 (1986). 
198 Kerr v. First Commodity Corp. of Boston, 735 F.2d 281, 289 (8th Cir. 1984); Sterling v. 
Velsicol, 647 F. Supp. 303, 324 (W.D. Tenn. 1986); Owen, supra note 177, at 1266 (citing 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) (Tent. Draft No. 19, 1973». 
199 Dayton Malleable, 11 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 21030. 
200 Id. 
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slap on the hand. "201 Although Dayton Malleable involved a judge-
determined civil penalty pursuant to the Ohio Clean Water Act, it 
demonstrates the need to consider a defendant's financial condition 
when evaluating the size of a verdict. 
In environmental cases, punitive damages may also serve a sig-
nificant compensatory function. Quite often compensatory damage 
awards alone do not provide adequate compensation to the plain-
tiff.202 Even though punitive damages are technically a separate 
award from compensatory damages, they can actually operate in a 
remedial way. When awarded in cases involving environmental is-
sues, exemplary damages may playa significant remedial role that 
benefits the public as well as the plaintiff. Environmental plaintiffs 
who recover punitive damages may benefit the public indirectly by 
using the award to restore the environment to its natural or pre-
polluted state. For example, in Miller v. Cudahy, 203 the judge 
awarded the plaintiffs $10 million for the defendant corporation's 
pollution of their natural aquifers. Because the clean-up plan offered 
by the defendants in lieu of punitive damages was never imple-
mented, the judge reinstated the award. 204 That award could be used 
by the plaintiffs to implement their own clean-up plan and thereby 
benefit the environment and ultimately the public. 
B. Policy Factors Supporting Punitive Damage Awards in 
Environmental Litigation 
One factor that a court should consider is the duration of the 
conduct as an indication of a defiant attitude toward environmental 
protection. 205 This factor would especially apply to toxic polluters. 
According to the Dayton Malleable court: 
A substantial penalty for a defiant attitude toward environmental 
regulation is justified in serving the deterrent ends of the scheme 
The protracted and unjustified delays on the facts before us, 
highlighted by a history of environmental insensitivity is sym-
bolic of this company's bad faith which, in turn, calls for the 
imposition of a substantial penalty. 206 
201Id. 
202 For a discussion of how punitive damages may also serve a compensatory function see 
generally Owen, supra note 177. 
203 No. 77-1212 (D. Kan. Mar. 3, 1987) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file). 
204 Id. 
205 Dayton Malleable, 11 Envtl. L. Rev. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 21030-31. 
206Id. at 21030. 
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Although this was a consideration in determining an appropriate 
penalty pursuant to a clean water statute, this factor would also be 
relevant in reviewing a punitive damage award in a toxic torts case. 
The longer a toxic polluter continues to dump pollutants into the 
environment, the more benefit is derived by avoiding costs to dispose 
of these chemicals in safer ways. Further, the greater the duration 
of the violation, the more damage results to the environment, thus 
making the violator's action more egregious and more deserving of 
punishment. 
The defendant's bad faith toward environmental concerns was also 
a consideration in Miller v. Cudahy.207 For many years the defen-
dants in Miller had polluted the aquifers of the surrounding farmland 
owned by the plaintiffs.208 In 1984, the district court awarded the 
plaintiffs $10 million in punitive damages to be held in abeyance 
while the defendants attempted a good faith clean-up effort to return 
the aquifer to its pre-polluted state. 209 Exasperated with the defen-
dants failure to take any curative action after the 1984 order, and 
with the considerable length of time that the defendants had polluted 
the aquifer, the court ordered the defendants to pay the $10 million 
punitive damage award with interest from August 13, 1984.210 The 
Miller court further stated that the defendants' promise to clean up 
the aquifer did not obligate the court to remit the punitive damage 
award. 211 If punitive damage awards could be remitted solely because 
the defendant has engaged in "ameliorative behavior," then no pu-
nitive damages would ever be enforced,212 and defendants could use 
dilatory tactics to avoid any reparation costS. 213 Although the court 
would have preferred to see the aquifer returned to its pre-polluted 
state, retaining jurisdiction over such a clean-up plan is not feasible 
because "courts are not functionally capable of overseeing something 
of such duration. "214 Under such circumstances a court or jury would 
be justified in awarding a large punitive damage award "in the 
vigilant pursuit of environmental regulation for the public inter-
est. "215 
207 No. 77-1212 (D. Kan. Mar. 3, 1987) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file). 
208 Id. 
209 Miller v. Cudahy Co., 592 F.Supp. 976 (D. Kan. 1984). 
210 Miller, No. 77-1212 (D. Kan. Mar. 3, 1987) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file). 
211 Id. 
212Id. 
213Id. 
214Id. 
215 Dayton Malleable, 11 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 21031. 
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Another factor courts should consider when faced with a large 
punitive damage award is whether the defendant's unlawful conduct 
is something that is widespread practice in the industry. If it is a 
situation where similarly situated companies would have done the 
same, then there is a greater need for deterrence. 216 This is especially 
true where the conduct is economically beneficial and is difficult to 
police. 217 When a jury awards punitive damages, other perpetrators 
would realize that such practices are being policed and that their 
chances of being detected have increased. 218 That realization coupled 
with the likelihood of a substantial punitive damage award would 
eradicate the economic benefits of conducting a certain activity, such 
as unsafe but inexpensive disposal of toxic wastes. 219 The loss of 
economic incentive and the possible exposure to liability would then 
motivate the environmental perpetrator to take remedial action. 220 
The deterrent value of an exemplary award, therefore, is great and 
should be a factor that the court weighs heavily when confronted 
with a purportedly excessive verdict. 221 
Courts should also consider that in cases involving environmental 
harm, actual damage to the environment is difficult to quantify, 222 
making a remittitur harder to justify.223 In most cases involving 
pollution, more than one source acts in concert to cause an unquan-
tifiable harm to the ecosystem, sometimes with irreversible ef-
fects. 224 Because of this inherent uncertainty in assessing environ-
mental harm, judges are not necessarily in a better position to arrive 
at an appropriate award than are juries in environmental cases. 225 
Although substantial punitive awards often seem justified by the 
facts, many have warned against such awards. Criticism of large 
216 See Owen, supra note 177, at 1286; Starr, supra note 197, at 383. This is the situation 
for toxic pollution where "[f]or every case of criminal pollution that is detected and prosecuted, 
dozens, even hundreds, continue undetected and unabated." [d. 
217 See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 143 (1977); Owen, supra note 177, at 
1288-90. 
218 Owen, supra note 177, at 1285. 
219 See R. POSNER, supra note 217, at 164-65; Owen, supra note 177, at 1285. 
220 See generally R. POSNER, supra note 217; Owen, supra note 177, at 1285. 
221 Some may argue that this sort of policy consideration is beyond the scope of the judicial 
role. Deterrence, however, is one of the factors to be weighed in assessing punitive damages. 
Thus, it would be within the court's role to consider deterrence as a factor in making a decision 
on remittitur. 
222 Dayton Malleable, 11 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 21029 ("the actual damage 
cannot be precisely ascertained or is incapable of measurement"). 
223 See supra notes 138-42 and accompanying text. 
224 Dayton Malleable, 11 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 21031. 
225 See supra notes 138-42 and accompanying text. 
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jury awards has arisen especially in connection with asbestos-related 
cases. 226 Despite the pressure from certain commentators, insurance 
companies and defense attorneys that the current practice of as-
sessing punitive damage awards should be reformed or eradicated ,227 
226 Given the long latency period of the disease, Surrick, supra note 165, at 271-73 (citing 
Selikoff, Hammond & Seidman, Latency of Asbestos Disease Among Insulation Workers in 
the United States and Canada, 46 CANCER 2736 (1980» (other citations omitted), the wide-
spread exposure of the population to asbestos, id. at 271-72, the tremendous number of 
asbestos-related lawsuits filed, Seltzer, supra note 176, at 37 n.1, and the bankruptcy petitions 
filed by several companies, Surrick, supra note 165, at 301, several judges, legal commenta-
tors, defense attorneys and insurance companies believe that asbestos-related litigation will 
result in a "standstill of the American Judicial System." Id. at 273 (citations omitted). 
Those who criticize large punitive damage awards in asbestos-related litigation have also 
expressed concern that the "victims of asbestosis, a class temporally deployed across decades 
and comprising an open end extending no man knows how far into the future: the compensatory 
bucket may well be emptied by punitive damages long before remote members are even in a 
position to line up for a compensatory drink." Louisiana ex rei. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 
F.2d 1019, 1033 (5th Cir. 1985) (Gee, J., concurring). 
227 The concern that large punitive damage awards present a threat to our legal and economic 
system was first expressed by Judge Friendly in Roginsky u. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 
F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967). In Roginsky, the plaintiff sought to recover compensatory and punitive 
damages for injuries caused by the drug. MER/29, developed by Richardson-Merrell, Inc. to 
lower blood cholesterol levels. Id. at 834. The jury awarded the plaintiff $100,000 in punitive 
damages, which the appellate court reversed. Id. at 850-51. Judge Friendly expressed concern 
for the ramifications of awarding punitive damages in mass disaster tort litigation by stating 
that: 
The legal difficulties engendered by claims for punitive damages on the part of 
hundreds of plaintiffs are staggering. If all recovered punitive damages in the amount 
here awarded these would run into tens of millions [of dollars] .... We have the 
gravest difficulty in perceiving how claims for punitive damages in such a multiplicity 
of actions throughout the nation can be so administered as to avoid overkill. 
Id. at 839. 
However, the drastic results that Judge Friendly predicted did not come true. Of the 
approximately 1500 claims against the manufacturer, over ninety-five percent were settled. 
Owen, supra note 177, at 1324; Seltzer, supra note 176, at 54. Of the eleven cases that went 
to a jury, four defense verdicts were returned and only three of the plaintiffs' verdicts included 
punitive damages. Of these three awards for punitive damages, one was reversed and the 
other two were substantially reduced. Owen, supra note 177, at 1324; Selzter, supra note 
176, at 54. 
Another argument in favor of greatly limiting or eradicating punitive damage awards in 
certain cases is that compensatory damages when aggregated serve the same function as 
punitive damage awards. According to Judge Surrick of Pennsylvania, "[i]t appears that, in 
asbestos litigation, the retributive and deterrent functions normally reserved to punitive 
damages are being substantially performed by the compensatory damages that defendants 
are being called upon to pay and will be called upon to pay .... " Surrick, supra note 165, at 
295. However, liability for compensatory damages may be insured, in which case they would 
not serve as a punishment and deterrent. Owen, supra note 177, at 1323. Due to the public 
policy underlying exemplary damages, it is generally required that the awards be paid out of 
the corporate treasury and protection against exemplary damages may not be provided by 
insurance. Surrick, supra note 165, 284-85 (footnote omitted). 
It has also been argued that large pumtive damage awards are contrary to the eighth 
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courts should continue to recognize the importance of punitive dam-
ages in environmental litigation. Although those who complain about 
large jury verdicts would have us believe that these verdicts are the 
bane of our economic and legal systems, there have been no persua-
'sive indications that either our judicial system or our economy have 
suffered any drastic consequences as a result of these large awards. 
Courts should not allow the opinions of those who stand to lose 
the most from large punitive damage verdicts to affect their decisions 
in individual cases where the reckless or negligent conduct of a 
corporation has seriously harmed the environment. Besides, it is not 
the role of the judiciary to make economic policy decisions. Whether 
or not large jury verdicts pose a threat to our economy is for Con-
gress, not the federal courts, to decide. It is the role of Congress to 
develop economic policy, not the courts when deciding individual 
cases. 
The strongest argument against large punitive damage verdicts is 
the negative domino effect that large damage awards supposedly 
have on the economy. An equally compelling factor is the existence 
of potential plaintiffs who also deserve compensation. These concerns 
must also be weighed against the need to protect the environment 
from ever-increasing toxic pollution and other threats. For the long 
run, there will arguably be greater benefit in leaning toward this 
side of the equation. 228 Policing abuses of our environment is impor-
tant to preserve the quality of our air, water and other vital re-
sources. If remittitur were to be liberally applied in environmental 
cases, we would lose a very important tool in forcing potential pol-
luters to take the environmental impact of their activity into account. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In cases involving environmental issues, remittitur is most fre-
quently called upon to reduce large punitive damage awards. Puni-
amendment. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986); Geller & Levy, supra 
note 73, at 88-91. The United States Supreme Court recently rejected this argument in 
Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 56 U.S.L.W. 4418 (U.S. May 16, 1988), aff"d 483 
So. 2d 254 (Miss. 1986), 54 U.S.L.W. 3743 (U.S. Apr. 26, 1986) (No. 85-1765), prob. juris. 
noted, 55 U.S.L.W. 3607 (U.S. Mar. 9, 1987) (No. 85-1765), and has yet to be decided. 
Previously, the Supreme Court has held that the eighth amendment only applies to criminal 
sanction. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977). 
22' See Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. MIV Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1052 (5th Cir. 1985) (Wisdom, 
J., dissenting). After noting that there are marginal diminishing returns once damages surpass 
a "certain measure of enormity," Judge Wisdom stated that, "we have no idea what this 
measure is: Absent hard data, I would rather err on the side of receiving little additional 
benefit from imposing additional quanta of liability" rather than barring the victims' recovery 
because of a fiat marginal incentive curve. Id. 
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tive damages play an important role in environmental litigation, 
especially as a means of law enforcement. The trend toward tighter 
judicial control of punitive damage awards presents a threat to future 
exemplary awards in environmental cases. Without clear guidelines, 
courts may be compelled to find such awards excessive. Because of 
the importance of such awards to the enforcement of environmental 
protection, courts should take several considerations into account 
when making a decision on whether or not to grant a remittitur. 
Although it is not the function of civil courts to punish those who 
violate laws, federal courts should consider the importance of the 
"private attorney general theory" in bringing forth environmental 
perpetrators who would otherwise continue their activity unpun-
ished under the criminal justice system. Punitive damage awards 
left intact by judges would also have a strong deterrent effect on 
other environmental perpetrators. Exemplary awards may also 
serve a compensatory function and may help to finance the costs of 
restoring the environment. 
Remittitur is harder to justify where environmental harm is in-
volved. A defendant's conduct may have caused irreversible damage 
to the environment which is difficult to quantify. The duration of the 
conduct; whether the conduct was intentional as the result of cost-
benefit analysis; whether such practice is widespread in the industry; 
the harm caused to the environment and the threat posed to society 
by such conduct are all factors that federal courts should consider 
when making a decision on remittitur. Furthermore, all circuits of 
the federal courts should base their remittitur decisions on the max-
imum recovery standard as that standard is the most consistent with 
our rights under the seventh amendment. 
